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If recovery were likely, then logically the premiums did not purchase
insurance coverage in the payment year. Therefore, they would not be
deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense but would be
considered a capital asset. The FSLIC has recently announced to individual
associations that they will not have to pay any premiums in 1970 because
the aggregate of the two reserves has reached two per cent of total accounts,
and the secondary reserve will be used to discharge regular premium
5

obligationsY.

This announcement lends reliability to the Comptroller's predictions
that specified 1970 as the year in which the aggregate would exceed two per
cent. Although additional premium payments resume when the aggregate
falls to one and three-quarters per cent.5 3 the IRS will then have "current

statistics" rather than "future predictions" to bolster its argument that associations will recoup the value of additional premiums because they will
satisfy the associations' future obligations to pay regular premiums. The
additional premiums will be deductible when so used because the regular
premium requirement provides insurance coverage for the year in which paid.
To maintain the integrity of the taxable year, the IRS will defer deductibility until the year in which the additional premiums provide such insurance
and lose their taint of individual ownership. If the Comptroller's predictions
remain reliable, the use of the secondary reserve for insurance coverage will
be rendered inevitable and not "in the realm of pure speculation."
DOUGLAS

A.

WARD

ESTATE TAXATION: RESURRECTION OF THE PREMIUM
PAYMENT TEST DOOMED TO EARLY DEATH IN COURTS
Estate of Coleman, 52 T.C. 921, CCH Tax Court Reporter Dec. No. 29,734

(1969)
Decedent's three children purchased a life insurance policy on her life,
naming themselves as beneficiaries. Decedent had no incidents of ownership in the policy, but she did pay all the premiums, some of which were
paid in contemplation of death. Although the insurance proceeds were not
includible in decedent's gross estate under section 2042 of the Internal
52. Interview with Edgar Gregory, Comptroller of First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Gainesville, Florida, Feb. 12, 1970.
53. 12 U.S.C. §1727 (g) (1964).
1. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §2042: "The value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all property - (1) RECEIVABLE BY THE EXECUTOR-To the extent of the amount receivable
by the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent. (2) RECEIVABLE
BY OTHER BENEFICIARIES - To the extent of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries
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Revenue Code of 1954, the Internal Revenue Service included under section
2035 that portion of the proceeds attributable to the premiums paid in
contemplation of death.2 Because of this additional inclusion, the Commissioner asserted a deficiency in the estate tax. The United States Tax Court3
HELD, that no portion of the insurance proceeds should be included in the
decedent's gross estate under section 2035, the amount includible being limited
to the premiums paid in contemplation of death. 4 Judges Tietjens, Raum,
Dawson, and Simpson dissented.
Life insurance proceeds are includible in gross estates to the extent receivable by the executor; or to the extent receivable by other beneficiaries
if the decedent retained any incidents of ownership in the policy 5 The first
estate tax provision dealing with insurance6 included the amount receivable
by the executor as insurance proceeds from policies taken out by the decedent
on his own life; and it included amounts in excess of 40,000 dollars payable
to other beneficiaries when the decedent "took out" the policies. In 1942
Congress substituted a new test that required inclusion if the decedent paid
the premiums for a policy on his life or if he retained any of the incidents
of ownership. 7 Satisfaction of either criterion resulted in taxability, and the
as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent
possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in
conjunction with any other person. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term 'incident of ownership' includes a reversionary interest (whether arising by the express terms
of the policy or other instrument or by operation of law) only if the value of such reversionary interest exceeded 5 per cent of the value of the policy immediately before the
death of the decedent. As used in this paragraph, the term 'reversionary interest' includes
a possibility that the policy, or the proceeds of the policy, may return to the decedent or
his estate, or may be subject to a power of disposition by him. The value of a reversionary
interest at any time shall be determined (without regard to the fact of the decedent's
death) by usual methods of valuation, including the use of tables of mortality and actuarial
principles, pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate. In determining the value of a possibility that the policy or proceeds thereof may be subject to
a power of disposition by the decedent, such possibility shall be valued as if it were a
possibility that such policy or proceeds may return to the decedent or his estate."
2. Brief for Respondent at 6, Estate of Coleman, 52 T.C. 921, CCH TAX Cr. REP. Dec.
No. 29,734 (1969).
3. As a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, the Tax Court is
now part of the judicial branch of the federal government and is called "The United
States Tax Court." FED. EST. & GiFr TAX REP. No. 191, at 2 (Jan. 19, 1970).
4. Estate of Coleman, 52 T.C. 921, CCH TAx CT. REP. Dec No.. 29,734 (1969).
5. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §2042.
6. 1918 Act, §402 (f), which included insurance proceeds: "To the extent of the amount
receivable by the executor as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his
own life; and to the extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other
beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life."
7. Int Rev. Code of 1939, §811 (g), as amended by 1942 Act., §§404 (a), (c). The applicable
portion reads: "Sec. 811 (g). PROCFEDs OF LIFE INSURANCE (1) RECEIVABLE BY THE EXECUTOR To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under policies upon
the life of the decedent. (2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER BENEFICIARIES -To the extent of the
amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies upon the life of
the decedent (A) purchased with premiums, or other consideration, paid directly or indirectly by the decedent, in propprtion that the amount so paid by the decedent bears to
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40,000 dollar floor was discarded. Underlying the change was the testamentary
character of life insurance. When an insured paid the premiums he provided
for a death transfer of the policy proceeds. 9 Thus, the estate was to be taxed
on the proceeds as on death transfers of other property.
This approach, however, discriminated against life insurance.t ' Realizing
that this treatment was inequitable, 1 Congress discarded the premium payment test in the 1954 Code, 12 although continuing the twofold approach of
the earlier acts. The proceeds are included in the gross estate to the extent
receivable by the executor or, if there are other beneficiaries, to the extent
the decedent retained any incidents of ownership." Congressional intent was
reaffirmed in 1957 when a Treasury attempt to reinstate the premium pay14
ment test was rejected.
Recently the Service, using section 2035 of the 1954 Code, has attempted
to do administratively what Congress had refused to do legislatively. 5
Although other sections of the Code include in a gross estate property controlled by a decedent at death,' 6 section 2035 includes property that a decedent
transferred during life. 17 It provides that the gross estate includes any property

the total premiums paid for the insurance, or (B) with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person."
8. Although the decedent may have transferred all incidents of ownership to a third
party, the proceeds were includible in his gross estate if he continued paying the premiums.
Walker, Current Developments in the Taxation of Life Insurance, U. So. CAL. 1969 TAX
INST. 569, 572 (1969).
9. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1942).
10. For example, assume father acquires livestock and simultaneously purchases an insurance policy on his own life, naming his adult son, A, as beneficiary. The following month
he transfers the policy to A, retaining no incidents of ownership. He gives the livestock to
his adult son, B, on his 25th birthday. Father continues paying premiums on the policy
and buys the best feed for the livestock while contemplating his own death. This conduct
continues for three years until father dies. The payments for the feed are included in his
gross estate as gifts in contemplation of death, but the livestock is outside the estate because it was given with life motives. However, both the premiums and the entire proceeds
of the insurance policy are included because the insured has paid the premiums.
II. The new code revised the estate tax so that the payment of premiums was no
longer a factor. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A316 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1954). The congressional debate was intense. See 100 CONG. REc.
9499-9505 (1954).
12. INT. REv. COOE of 1954, §2042.
13. For a definition of the term "incidents of ownership," see Treas. Reg. §20.20421 (c) (2). For a discussion of the term see Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
14. H.R. REP. No. 8381, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1957).
15. Brown & Sherman, Payment of Premiums as Transfers in Contemplation of Death,
101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 790 (1962).
16. INT. Rrv. CODE of 1954, §§2033-34, 2036-42.
17. INT. Rev. CODE of 1954, §2035: "(a) GENERAL RULE-The value of the gross estate
shall include the value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, in contemplation
of his death. (b) APPLICATION OF GENERAL RULE - If the decedent within a period of 3
years ending with the date of his death (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate
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that the decedent transferred in contemplation of death. Gifts made more
than three years prior to the decedent's death are conclusively presumed not
to be transfers in contemplation of death. If made within the three-year
period, the gift is presumed made in contemplation of death unless the estate
can prove that it was made with life motives.' 8 In that case, the transferred
property will not be included in the gross estate. 19
Property captured by section 2035 is valued at the applicable valuation
date, 20 not at the date of the transfer. The Service used this rationale to
argue that giving insurance premiums is a gift of insurance protection, not
of cash,21 Thus, if the premium is paid in contemplation of death, the value
of the payment is the portion of the proceeds purchased rather than the dollar
amount of the premium. This logic culminated in Revenue Ruling 67-463,22
which provides that the proceeds includible in a gross estate equal an amount
bearing the same ratio to the total proceeds receivable as the premiums paid
in contemplation of death bear to the total premiums paid.23 Thus, the result
24
is the same as if Congress had never eliminated the premium payment test.

and full consideration in money or money's worth) transferred an interest in property,
relinquished a power, or exercised or released a general power of appointment, such transfer, relinquishment, exercise, or release shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to
have been made in contemplation of death within the meaning of this section and sections
2038 and 2041 (relating to revocable transfers and powers of appointment); but no such
transfer, relinquishment, exercise, or release made before such 3-year period shall be
treated as having been made in contemplation of death."
18. Facts considered in determining whether a decedent transferred property with death
motives are: the age of the decedent at the time of the transfer, the nature and disposition
of the decedent, his health, the existence of a general testamentary scheme, and the intent
to avoid estate taxes. Life motives are evidenced by the desire to avoid income taxes, the
wish to prevent family strife, and the vicarious enjoyment of the donee's use of the property.
It is a fact question. R. STms'sNs & G. MAxF.ELD, THE FEDERAL ESTATE AND Gsrr TAxns 59-60
(2d ed. 1967).
19. While this burden seems great, the Commissioner has fared poorly on the issue.
E.g., Kniskern v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
20. The taxpayer may select, as the valuation date, the date of death (§2031) or one
year after the date of death (§2032). The value of the property at the proper date will be
the amount includible in the gross estate. Treas. Reg. §20.2035-1 (e) (1969).
21. Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 Cum. BULL. 327.
22. Id. Advice had been requested whether any portion of the proceeds of an insurance
policy was includible in a decedents gross estate because he had paid the premiums, although he had parted with the incidents of ownership. The Service reasoned that the
payments made within the three-year period prior to his death were gifts of insurance protection to the contract beneficiaries, and that they were made in contemplation of death.
Thus, the proceeds were includible in the gross estate.

23.

Premiums paid in contemplation
of death
The ratio is:
Total Premiums

24.

The rejected test of the 1939 Code is substantially identical:
Premiums paid by insured
Total premiums

"

Proceeds includible in
gross estate
Total proceeds

Proceeds includible in estate
Total proceeds..
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This reasoning has been challenged by writers25 and taxpayers. One case2 6
rejected the notion that the decedent made more than a gift of cash so far as
his payment of insurance premiums was concerned.2 7 Another court 2 implied
that when an insured transferred premiums for a policy that he did not own,
section 2035 valued the gift at the dollar amount of the premiums, not at
what the premiums purchased. 2 9 A third case 30 appeared to apply a 2035

premium payment test, but really used local law to determine that the decedent possessed incidents of ownership sufficient to include the proceeds
under section 2042.31

The only case that upheld Revenue Ruling 67-46332 was First National
Bank of Midland v. United States,33 where the district court applied it without comment. Two insurance policies were involved, one owned by the wife
of the insured, although the premiums on it were paid with community
property funds. The court found that the decedent owned one-half of the
policy, 3 4 and therefore, possessed incidents of ownership that satisfied the
test of section 2042, so that the proceeds were includible under that section,
not under 2035. The second policy was owned by the daughters of the insured,
but lie paid the premiums, a situation similar to the instant case. The proceeds
were perfunctorily included in the estate on the basis of Revenue Ruling
67-46335 without discussion of the taxpayer's claim or the wisdom of the
ruling. Because only one short paragraph dealt with this policy, it appears
that its proceeds were included because the proceeds of the first policy were
included.
25. Lowndes & Stephens, Identification of Property Subject to the Federal Estate Tax,
65 MICH. L. REV. 105, 124 (1966); Simmons, Contemplation of Death and the New Premium
Payment Test, 53 A.B.A.J. 475 (1967); Simmons, IRS Rules Premium Payments Within 3
Years of Death Puts Proceeds into Estate, 28 J. TAXATION 146 (1968); Walker, Current
Developments in the Taxation of Life Insurance, U. So. CAL. 1969 TAX INST. 569 (1969).

But see Warren, Hellawell & Dodyk, Comments on Gorman, CCH FED.
LAW REPORTS 2173 (1969).

TAXATION, TOPICAL

26. Lamade v. Brownell, 245 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Pa. 1965).
27. Walker, supra note 8, at 576.
28. Nance v. United States, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,403, 21 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 720 (D.
Ariz. 1968).
29. Comment, Premiums Paid in Contemplation of Death, Continuing Controversy Over
Revenue Ruling 463, 1969 LAw & SOCIAL ORDER 434, 439.
30. Scott v. Commissioner, 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967).
31. Two cases frequently cited as support for the ruling by the Commissioner are:
Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945); Estate of Loeb, 29 T.C. 22 (1957).
However, they were decided under the 1939 Code, which used a premium payment test
that was later abrogated by the 1954 Code.
32. 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 327.
33. 1969-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,829 (W.D. Tex. 1968), rev'd, 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970).
The reversal of Midland means that all courts that have considered Revenue Ruling 67-463
have found for the taxpayer. The court of appeals relied on the instant case and Gorman
v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225, 1968-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 88,378 (E.D. Mich. 1968), to
reverse the district court. First Nat'l Bank of Midland v. United States, 423 F.2d 1286, 1289
(5th Cir. 1970).
34. See Blackmon v. Hansen, 140 Tex. 536, 169 S.W.2d 962 (1943).
35. 1967-2 Cums. BULL. 327.
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In Gorman v. United States3 6 the court considered the revenue ruling
and found for the taxpayer. A policy had been issued to decedent's wife, who
alone possessed the incidents of ownership. The decedent had paid the
premiums, and the Service contended that the proceeds attributable to
payments made within three years of his death were includible in his gross
estate. The court asserted that the revenue ruling was "startling in that it
completely ignore[d] the legislative history and intent relating to the elimination of the premium payment test from the Code," 37 and rejected it because
it would disrupt estate planning.3 8 The court reasoned that because the
decedent was not the policyowner, he had no transferable interest in the
policy. Therefore, only the dollar amount of the premiums was includible
as a gift in contemplation of death.
In the instant case 39 the court discussed the terms "transfer" and "interest,"
the key words of section 2035. The majority emphasized that a transfer of
the policy within the scope of section 2035 would have occurred if the decedent had owned the policy and then transferred it with death motives
within three years of her death. However, if she had given money to her
children who in turn had used it to purchase a policy on her life, there would
have been no 2035 transfer. In the instant case the decedent had bypassed
her children by giving the money directly to the insurance company.
The court focused on what the decedent had given up and concluded that
the decedent had no interest in the proceeds even though her premium payments had sustained the economic substance of the children's ownership. The
decisive issue was that what the payments had kept alive was theirs, not hers.
The only thing that she had diverted from her estate was the actual money
paid, and that was all that section 2035 should include. The court relied on
the legislative history of section 2042 to determine that there was no constructive transfer of a policy interest. It did not broadly construe 2035 because
Congress had intended to inter the premium payment test when it enacted
the present Code. 40
There were three written dissents. Judge Tietjens concluded that the
issue was the value of the transferred item, not what was transferred. He
reasoned that the value was measured by the thing purchased instead of the
cash paid.41 Judge Raum also saw the question as one of valuation and contended that the value of the purchase at the applicable valuation date was
the measure of the amount includible in the gross estate. Judge Dawson
agreed, and added that in substance the decedent was the policyowner
42
even though the children were the formal owners.
36. 288 F. Supp. 225, 1968-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 88,378 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
37. Id. at 226, 1968-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 88,381.

38. Id. at 230, 1968-2 U.S. Tax. Gas. at 88,384. The court said the mere fact that a tax
break might arise from deletion of the premium payment test was no reason for the Service
to argue that the benefit should not inure to the taxpayer.
39. 52 T.C. 921.
40. S.REP.No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1954).
41. Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327, 337 (1929).
42. This approach would require application of §2042 since it makes the decedent
the owner. That section would not include the proceeds.
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After the present case the vitality of Revenue Ruling 67-4634 3 is questionable because of its rejection in the federal district court, 4 the court of
appeals, 45 and the Tax Court.4 6 However, since the Service is not bound by
these decisions, 47 the issues raised by the case remain.
The first is the matter of ownership. For estate tax purposes section 2042
determines whether a decedent "owned" a policy to the extent necessary for
taxability. Less than a five per cent reversionary interest in the proceeds is
not enough ownership to warrant the tax."s One must own something to
be able to give it to another, 49 and a transfer of premiums vests no ownership
in the transferor.5° Thus, it is difficult to visualize any proprietary rights of
a decedent in a situation similar to that of the present case.
A different result is possible in community property states5l because
section 2042 defers to local law for determining ownership.52 Section 2042
requirements"3 are satisfied when premiums paid from community funds
entitle each spouse to economic benefits in the policy. 54 In First National
Bank of Midland v. United States5 the court relied on Texas law 50 to hold
that each spouse had an interest in the policy when premiums were paid with
community funds. Thus, inclusion of insurance proceeds is more likely in
community property states.
The second question is whether the decedent possessed an "interest" in
the policy. Section 2042 speaks of ownership, while 2035 concerns "interests
in property." Although ownership is not to be construed narrowly, 57 an
interest may be entirely different. Section 2033 includes in gross estates any
"interests in property which a decedent possessed,"' 8 and 2035 includes such
interests when they are transferred in contemplation of death. The Service

43.
44.
1968).
45.
46.
instant
47.
48.

1967-2 CubM. BULL. 327.
Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225, 1968-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 88,738 (E.D. Mich.
First Nat'l Bank of Midland v. United States, 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970).
Estate of Coleman, 52 T.C. 921. A more recent case in the tax court reaffirms the
case. Estate of Chapin, FED. EST. & GIFT TAX REP. No. 191, at 2 (Jan. 19, 1970).

J. CHOMMIE,

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

INT. REV. CODE of

14 (1968).

1954, §2042.

49. Estate of Karagheusian, 23 T.C. 806 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 233 F.2d 197
(2d Cir. 1956). See also

J.

MERTENS,

2

LAW OF

FEDERAL

GIFT

AND ESTATE TAXATION

647

(1959); Brown & Sherman, supra note 15, at 792.
50. 6 J. CoUcT, INSURANCE §31:163 (2d ed. Anderson 1961).
51. One commentator even said that the premium payment test remains significant
only where community property is concerned. J. MERTENS, supra note 49, at 157 (Supp.
1969).
52. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §2042.

53. Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1 (c) (2) (1969).
54. For a good discussion of community property laws and their application to insurance, see Stephens, Life Insurance and Community Property in Texas- Revisited, 10
Sw. L.J. 343 (1956).
55. 1969-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,829 (W.D. Tex. 1968), rev'd. 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970).
56. See Blackmon v. Hansen, 140 Tex. 536, 169 S.W.2d 962 (1943).
57. Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1 (1969).
58.

INT. REV. CODE of

1954, §2033.
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contended that Revenue Ruling 67-46359 properly applied section 2035
because an insured always has an interest in the policy since his death determines when the proceeds are paid.
However, the death of an insured cannot be considered an interest. The
only connection of an insured to the insurance contract, unless he owns it,
is the event of his death. 60 An event is less of an interest in the proceeds
61
than a five per cent reversionary interest, which is not taxable.
Accepting the contention of the Service that such an interest warrants
inclusion, a third issue then arises: whether there was a transfer of that
interest so as to make 2035 applicable. 62 Only two theories create the fiction
of a transfer needed to satisfy section 2035. The first is the revocable transfer
theory rejected by Gorman v. United States.63 Under this approach the proceeds are includible because the transfer is not considered complete until
death. This theory is applicable only to revocable transfers, while gifts of
life insurance are generally irrevocable, 64 especially when the insured has
no rights in the policy. Therefore, no 2035 transfer takes place under the
revocable transfer theory.
The second hypothesis is that a trust corpus is includible in a gross estate
when the assets comprising the corpus are transferred in contemplation of
death. This is comparable to the premium payment situation because the
premiums are the specific assets comprising the proceeds or corpus. The
proceeds partially represent the appreciation of the premiums paid. The
Gorman court analyzed this trust theory and concluded that it too was in65
applicable.
The trust concept ignores the fact that the appreciation does not arise
from the payment itself, but results from the contractual agreement between
the policyowner and the insurance company. The theory also disregards the
fact that life insurance premiums are composed of parts that do not relate
to the proceeds. 66 Computation problems resulting from this would make
the proceeds purchased by insurance premiums incalculable. For these
reasons a 2035 transfer cannot be sustained on a trust theory.
Without a transfer the alleged interest of the insured remains with him
until his death, and section 2035 does not apply. Only section 2042 can
apply, but it rejects the premium payment test. Thus, the proceeds are not
includible under either section, as Congress intended.
The remaining issue, the value of the thing transferred, deals with two
questions. The first is the nature of the gift, which the gift tax regulations
59. 1967-2 Cum. BuLL. 327.
60. The owner is in effect betting with the insurance company on the date of the
death of the insured.
61. Ir. REv. CODE Of 1954, §2042.
62. R. STEPHENS 8=G. MAxPIELD, supra note 18, at 60.
63. 288 F. Supp. 225, 1968-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 88,378 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
64. Id.
65. Id. For a good discussion of the trust theory's applicability to insurance, see Goodnow v. United States, 302 F.2d 516 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
66. See Simmons, Contemplation of Death and the New Premium Payment Test, 53
A.B.A.J. 475, 476 (1967).
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state is the specific asset transferred. Applying such regulations to section
2635 for valuation purposes is questionable because the regulations value a
donation when it is made, while 2035 values an inter vivos gift at the applicable valuation date, which always occurs after the date of the transfer. However, to determine what the gift was, the gift tax regulations can be applied. 6
Thus, when the gift of insurance premiums is made, it is cash; and its nature
cannot change simply because it was transferred in contemplation of death.The second part of the valuation question is concerned with the actual
value of the transferred cash. The Fifth Circuit has held70 that the transferred
property itself must be valued at the proper valuation date. A cash gift can
only be valued at its dollar amount, and what it purchases is irrelevant. This
result is correct because the decedent had only dollars to transfer.
The instant case is important because it rejects the Service's attempt to
rewrite the estate tax statutes. 71 The decision is consistent with congressional
intent and facilitates estate planning, although in community property states
the insured must take care that he acquires no incidents of ownership when
he pays insurance premiums.
The instant case is being appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
but reversal seems unlikely since the courts have recognized that Congress has
stated the standards for includibility, and that these standards must be
obeyed.* It is unfortunate that the Internal Revenue Service persists in using
section 2035 to resurrect the premium payment test.
WILLIAM

E.

SCHEU, JR.

67. Treas. Reg. §25.2512-6 (a), example 1 (1963): "A donor purchases from a life
insurance company for the benefit of another a life insurance contract or a contract for the
payment of an annuity. The value of the gift is the cost of the contract."
68. The Gorman court specifically applied such a regulation. 288 F. Supp. 225, 232,
1968-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 88,378, 88,385 (E.D. Mich. 1968). See also Brown & Sherman, supra
note 15, at 790.
69. Goodnow v. United States, 302 F.2d 516 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
70. Humphrey v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1947) (irrevocable gift). But see
Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1942) (revocable gift).
71. "Neither we nor the Commissioner may rewrite the statute simply because we may
feel that the scheme it creates could be improved upon." United States v. Calamaro, 354
U.S. 351, 357 (1957).
*EDrrOR's NOTE: Because of the Midland reversal in the court of appeals, 423 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1970), the Internal Revenue Service has decided not to appeal the instant case.
It also will not seek certiorari to the Supreme Court on the Midland decision. Letter from
Sydney S. Traum to E. W. Pavenstedt, May 26, 1970.
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